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Philip Mahoney & Peter Moran 
Centre for Enterprise & Management, 
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Bolton, Lancashire, UK BL3 5AB. 
 
Introduction. 
Over the last twenty years the politico-environmental context in which UK Local 
Authorities operate has altered considerably. The “ethic cleansing” (McNulty, 1997) 
of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) was introduced by the first 
conservative administration led by Thatcher, under which local authorities were 
forced to outsource large swathes of municipal services to the private sector if they 
could not provide them at lower cost. This was supplemented by the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) whereby what were once considered mainstream public sector capital 
projects were undertaken on the provision that the private sector contributed a 
proportion of the capital required and expertise connected with large scale project and 
risk management. In mid 1997, in the wake of a landslide victory for the Blairite New 
Labour Party, the vestiges of PFI remain ingrained whilst CCT has been replaced by 
Best Value which can be understood as: 
…a duty to deliver services to clear standards – covering both cost and quality 
– by the most effective, economic and efficient means available  
(Department of Environment, Transport & The Regions, 1988:64). 
 
  
The 1998 White Paper, “Modern Local Government – In Touch With the People”, 
lays out a substantial agenda of reforms. The underlying principle of this agenda is 
based on governance and: 
…puts the users of services at the heart of the system 
(Taylor, 1999: 5). 
 
It is on this premise that the Chartered Institute of Public Finance Accountants 
(CIPFA) has provided the model of Best Value shown in Figure One.  
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  Figure One. The CIPFA Best Value Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CIPFA, 1998. 
 
Under the provisions of this model, the role of stakeholders is central. Just as they are 
acted upon by the development of objectives and policies, the activities that spring 
from them and the means by which are reviewed improved shared and 
audited/sustained, so they have the ability to act upon them.  
 
If Taylor is correct, which perhaps can only be determined in the longer term, then 
Best Value varies considerably from regimes developed under CCT , whereby the 
“consumers” of the service had their interests protected by the profit motive of the 
private sector in delivering services that had erstwhile been the sole provenance of the 
public sector. Under the partnership arrangements emphasised by Best Value, then 
some stakeholders will have the opportunity to switch providers from Local Authority 
providers, to those from the private sector and vice versa. Saliently, the temporal 
enforcement of either public or private provision emphasised by the nature of CCT, 
(contracts awarded on a basis of n-years) can be replaced by choice on a “job by job” 
basis. This temporal-task flexibility, which acts to reinforce the significance of 
stakeholder choice, appears to support Taylor’s assertion that stakeholders, (rather 
than those “policing” CCT provisions) will occupy centre stage under Best Value. 
 
Stakeholders 
Objectives and 
Policies 
Review Activities Audit and Sustain 
Show and Share Target Improvement 
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This paper examines this provisional hypothesis through the vehicle of a case study. It 
analyses the emergent partnership sought with private sector property developers and 
other parties by a Local Authority Building Control (LABC) section. The initial 
purpose of this research was to assess the potential of two marketing initiatives 
connected to LABC services through the Partner Approach and the Development 
Team Approach (DTA). Shortly afterwards, it struck the authors that this aim should 
be accompanied also by an analysis of the scope for the derailment of the spirit of 
such arrangements. This is undertaken by utilising the stakeholder analysis model 
devised by Mitchell Agle and Wood (1997) aligned with an application of Gramsci’s 
(1971) twin conceptualisation of hegemony and coercion 
 
 
Coercion and Hegemony. 
Drawing on a predominantly Marxist worldview, Antonio Gramsci offered one 
explanation of mass populations across Europe during the reign of fascism. Although 
the current historical context is now radically different, the dominance of the State (or 
perhaps a coalition of states such as the European Union) is still a reality. It was a 
“dominant” state that imposed CCT and it is a “dominant” state that has supplanted 
Best Value in its stead.  
 
The terms hegemony and coercion are defined respectively as: 
 
1. The “spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to 
the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental 
group; this consent is historically caused by the prestige (and consequent 
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and 
function in the world of production. 
 
2. The apparatus of state coercive power which legally enforces discipline on 
those groups who do not consent either actively or passively.  
   (Gramsci, 1971: 12). 
 
The statutory effect of Best Value on local authorities under the Local Government 
Act 1999, requires them to carry out a programme of best value reviews which will be 
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incorporated into published local performance plans by 31st March 2000. CCT is to be 
abolished in favour of a partnership approach to the procurement of public services: 
 
Central Government believes that partnership working, including the creation 
of companies and other structures to promote joint ventures and co-operation 
will have an important role to play in improving service delivery  
(DETR, 1999: 1). 
 
The partnership principle will apply to all services including building control and 
underpins the review mechanism aimed at assisting in the demonstration of Best 
Value achievement. 
 
What is Building Control? 
Building Control is traditionally a regulatory local authority service to ensure that 
health and safety standards are maintained in and around buildings. The service 
functions can be split into two broad areas: 
a) Enforcement of Building Regulations and; 
b) General Building Control functions which include licensing, dealing with 
dangerous structures and demolition sites. 
Building Regulations enforcement can be further split into two functional areas: plan 
vetting, to check compliance of a development with statutory regulations, and on-site 
inspections, from commencement to completion of a development. 
 
Competitive tendering in local government construction related services became 
compulsory in the 1980’s. Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) was a 
prescriptive, contract-based mechanism:  
…which allowed local authorities to continue the provision of defined 
services, only if they had been successful in winning the work in competition 
(Davis and Walker, 1998: 585). 
 
Competition in building control however, was introduced under the auspices of the 
Building Act (1984) by the development of criteria for the acceptance of ‘Private 
Approved Inspectors’ that could compete on the open market for the provision of 
building (Regulation) control services. Obtaining an adequate level of public liability 
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insurance cover became a significant hurdle for approved inspector status and up to 
January 1997 there was only one competitor, NHBC Services Ltd., operating in the 
house building sector of the market.  
 
According to Day et al (1998), this type of scenario where private providers had 
carried out work could be credited to local authority services as if they had been 
subjected to CCT. Recent changes in the insurance industry have enabled the 
acceptance of further approved inspectors, operating in the lucrative commercial and 
industrial sector.  
 
 
As a consequence of increased competition, the marketing of LABC has intensified 
and according to Richardson (1999) some authorities have become adept at marketing 
and promotion. He accepts however, that there is a need for a national marketing 
strategy: 
…many authorities have no budget head and are quite ineffective due to 
shortage of time or lack of political will 
(Richardson, 1999: 29). 
 
“Townville” UDC (a pseudonym) Building Control have marketed the service in 
collaboration with other local authorities under the banner of the District Surveyors 
Association (DSA), a LABC management group. “Townville” has not yet, however, 
embraced two new marketing initiatives that emerged during 1997/98. These are the 
Partner Authority scheme and the Development Team Approach (DTA). 
 
The DTA is an internal partnership to provide a co-ordinated approach from local 
authority sections to developer proposals. The aim of this approach is to create a 
single point of contact for developers and reduce the scope for bureaucracy and 
conflicting advice. The DTA primarily involves Building Control and the 
Development Control section of the Planning Division. Representatives of 
Engineering and Highways, Business Services and the Chief Executive may also be 
involved together with, in some instances, outside agencies such as the fire service 
and utility companies. The partner authority scheme is effectively a work-share 
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scheme between local authorities which enables a local authority/developer 
partnership arrangement 
 
The LABC Partner Approach does not fit squarely into tested schemes such as those 
used to leverage resources, e.g. Strategic Regeneration Bid (SRB) or those tested in 
recent Best Value pilots. Joyce (1999) warns that whilst partnership may seem a good 
idea from a strategic management perspective, line managers may find difficulty in 
creating and sustaining partnership arrangements. Taylor (1999) however, observes 
that whilst LABC is one of the few local government services that have been exposed 
to the real market rather than the highly contrived CCT one, this factor alone will be 
insufficient to show Best Value. 
 
A survey by Newchurch consultants in 1997 (reported by Everett, 1997) revealed that 
a sample 61% of chief executives placed partnership building as the most important 
issue facing local authorities. The new cabinet decision making process in the council 
could be significant in influencing this process from a top-down perspective. It is 
important therefore that “Townville” Building Control provides a robust Best Value 
performance review and that this is communicated to stakeholders and the corporate 
centre in defence of the service. Paradoxically, it is this defence culture, expressed by 
Filkin (1999) as competition versus service that Best Value is attempting to eradicate. 
Significant pitfalls of the review process from a LABC perspective include 
benchmarking private competitors. 
 
Scepticism regarding the Best Value review process ranges from the belief that 
reviews may be side-stepped by the bureaucratic process (Bartlett et al 1998) to the 
view of Sanderson (1998) that performance indicators are an inappropriate measure of 
value and effectiveness in local government. The Building Control Section at 
“Townville” face the problem of addressing Best Value and the needs of its many 
stakeholders whilst seeking to gain competitive advantage in the Building Regulations 
market. Both a co-ordinating and prioritising strategy is sought. An empowerment 
strategy has been implemented (via the EFQM Business Excellence Model) but with 
very limited perceived success by staff members. The adoption of the partnership 
concept, internally and externally is therefore tentatively suggested as a means of 
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addressing these problems. This option has strategic, cultural, environment, resource 
and stakeholder implications. 
 
Thompson (1997) asserts that organisations, which balance the needs and 
expectations of stakeholders, perform better in the long term. Johnson & Scholes 
(1993) discuss the influence, which various stakeholder groups have on organisation 
strategy and conclude that power/interest; power/influence aspects should be analysed 
and several “mapping” techniques are illustrated. Johnson & Scholes believe that 
these techniques are useful in strategy choice implementation and evaluation. Johnson 
& Scholes (1993) argue that power is the mechanism by which expectations are able 
to influence strategies and sources of power must therefore be analysed.  
Issues of power are extremely important in strategy formulation with different 
subcultures within an organisation tending to offer different solutions to 
different problems based on their own interests 
(Brown, 1997: 212). 
 
 
 
Stakeholder Salience Typology 
Eden and Ackerman (1998) acknowledge that both Johnson and Scholes and Freeman 
(1984) are concerned with making links between environmental and stakeholder 
analysis. There have been several definitions of “stakeholder” since Freeman’s 
seminal work but Rowley (1999) argues that under any definition, an organisation is 
required to address a set of stakeholder expectations and that management choice is 
therefore informed by stakeholder influences. In addition to stakeholder identification, 
an identification and understanding of these influences, and how the firm responds to 
them is required.  
 
 
Mitchell Agle Wood Typology 
According to Frooman (1999), the most comprehensive work to date on this subject is 
that of Mitchell et al (1997) whose typology proposes that stakeholders can be 
identified by the attributes that they possess in relation to the firm. These attributes 
are Power, Legitimacy and Urgency. The identification typology is developed with a 
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dynamic theory of stakeholder salience offering an explanation of how managers 
prioritise relationships. The typology : 
 
allows predictions to be made about managerial behaviour with respect to 
each class of stakeholder, as well as predictions about how stakeholders 
change from one class to another and what this means to managers 
 (Mitchell et al 1997: 855). 
 
This typology offers a bridging concept between the broad and narrow views of 
stakeholder theory, which covers in turn, a preponderance of definitions, stakeholder 
attributes and influences, and their importance to organisations and significance to 
managers. Controversy surrounds stakeholder attributes from a contextual standpoint. 
Eden and Ackerman (1998) argue that strategically, stakeholders should be treated as 
having no rights, only power and interest. Freeman (1984) and latterly Frooman 
(1999) question the broader notion of the importance of legitimacy as a stakeholder 
attribute but Mitchell et al (1997) however, argue that power and legitimacy interact 
and when combined with urgency, create different expected behavioural patterns 
regarding the firm. 
 
Stakeholder Power. 
Mitchell et al consider a number of contributors to the organisational “power” debate, 
but borrow largely from Etzioni’s (1964) previous writings and the three types of 
transitory (i.e. can be gained as well as lost) organisational power he suggests: 
• Coercive power based on physical resources of force, violence or restraint. 
• Utilitarian power based on the availability and distribution of material or 
financial resources. 
• Normative power based on symbolic resources. 
 
Stakeholder Legitimacy. 
Whilst acknowledging the difficulties associated with precise definitions and concept 
operationalisation, Mitchell et al offer Suchman’s (1985) definition as the most 
adequate. He defined legitimacy as: 
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… a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions 
(Suchman, 1995:574). 
 
Stakeholder Urgency. 
Mitchell et al’s construct of urgency is based on two attributes and they stress that 
neither one is sufficient to identify stakeholder urgency in isolation: 
• Time sensitivity  
The degree to which managerial delay in attending to the claim or 
relationship is unacceptable to the stakeholder 
(Mitchell et al, 1997: 867). 
• And criticality 
The importance of the claim or relationship to the stakeholder 
 (Ibid: 867). 
 
They summarise stakeholder attributes as : 
1. Variable and not steady state; 
2. Socially constructed, not objective reality: attribution of power etc plays a key 
pert here. 
3. Consciousness and wilful exercise may or may not be present e.g. stakeholders 
may or may not correctly perceive the legitimacy of their claims or use the 
power that they hold. 
 
Salience to managers 
The emphasis on salience to managers is discussed in the context that it is managers 
who determine which stakeholders are salient: 
…in short, one can identify a firm’s stakeholders based on attributes, but 
managers may or may not perceive the stakeholder field correctly 
(Mitchell et al, 1997: 871).  
These authors argue that this is a cognitive approach to the problem of systematic 
description and identification leading to qualitative classes of stakeholders.  
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Stakeholder Classes 
Eight classes of stakeholder are illustrated. The proposal is that salience will be 
positively related to the cumulative number of attributes- power, legitimacy and 
urgency- perceived by managers to be present amongst these classes. 
                                                                    
Figure Two. Stakeholder Typology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The low salience classes (areas 1, 2 and 3) which we term “latent” 
stakeholders, are identified by their possession or attributed possession of 
only one of the attributes. The moderately salient stakeholders (areas 4,5 and 
6) are identified by their possession or attributed possession of two of the 
attributes, and because they are stakeholders who “expect something”, we 
call them expectant stakeholders. The combination of all three attributes 
(including the dynamic relations among them) is the defining feature of highly 
salient stakeholders (area 7). 
  (Mitchell et al, 1997, 873). 
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Stakeholder Attributes 
Mitchell et al (1997) propose that stakeholder salience will be low where just one of 
the attributes is perceived by managers to be present. The fluidity of the model is 
demonstrated by the potential for movement of classes around the spheres. For 
example, dormant stakeholders will become more salient if they acquire either 
urgency or legitimacy. Mitchell et al (1997) also argue that this framework provides a 
way to predict which set of stakeholders may become salient.  
 
Dominant stakeholders are both powerful and legitimate and thus “form the dominant 
coalition in the enterprise” (Cyert and March, 1963 in Mitchell et al, 1997: 827). In 
his criticism of performance measurement in local government, Sanderson (1998) 
observes that the values of dominant stakeholders are taken as given at the exclusion 
of participation in service planning and delivery by subordinate stakeholder groups. 
Mitchell et al (1997) however argue that it is possible to see how a dependent 
stakeholder can move into the definitive class by having its urgent claim adopted by 
dominant stakeholders. An analogy in a Best Value context is the intervention of 
central government as a result of poor performance to its (dependent) citizens by a 
local authority. 
 
Discretionary stakeholders are perceived as possessing legitimacy, but not power or 
urgent claims. In a sense perhaps, they can be most positively viewed as corporate (or 
individual?) philanthropists, capable of “donations” of resources to assist the 
organisation.  
 
Demanding stakeholders are characterised by possession of urgency alone: 
Demanding stakeholders, those with urgent claims but having neither power 
nor legitimacy, are the “mosquitoes buzzing in the ears” of managers: 
irksome but not dangerous, bothersome but not warranting more than passing 
management attention, if any at all. Where stakeholders are unable or 
unwilling to acquire either the power or the legitimacy necessary to move 
their claim to a more salient status, the “noise” of urgency is insufficient to 
project a stakeholder claim beyond latency 
 (Mitchell et al, 1997: 875-6). 
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Dangerous stakeholders are classified as possessing the attributes of urgency and 
power, but lack legitimacy. These stakeholders can be coercive, in the very sense 
suggested by Gramsci, perhaps offering coercion by illegitimate means. Mitchell et al 
suggest terrorist or environmentalist groups proffering threats as examples. 
 
Definitive stakeholders already have power and legitimacy: 
When such a stakeholder’s claim is urgent, managers have a clear and 
immediate mandate to attend to and give priority to that stakeholder’s claim.   
 (Mitchell et al, 1997: 878.Emphasis added). 
 
Mitchell et al (1997) argue that their model provides ability to recognise theoretically 
that stakeholder-manager relations are not static but in a constant state of flux. 
Furthermore, it allows a systematic sorting of stakeholder-manager relations allowing 
managers to become sensitised to the moral implications of their actions with respect 
to each stakeholder. 
 
Who are the Stakeholders? 
Internally, i.e. from “Townville” U.D.C. the stakeholders include; 
• The “Cabinet” of elected members 
• Senior Officers of the Local Authority (Chief Executive, City Planner, 
etc). 
• Employees from the Building Control section. 
• Other local authority departments potentially DTA partners (e.g. 
Highways, Street lighting, etc). 
 
Externally, the stakeholders include: 
• Architectural Practices 
• Building Contractors 
• House Builders 
• Quantity Surveyors 
• Design Consultants 
• Engineering Consultants. 
• The citizens of   “Townville”. 
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Finance and Dominance of Priority. 
Significantly, approved private inspectors do not deal with work generated by 
domestic house extensions, preferring the more lucrative contracts available in the 
commercial sector. LABC sections, however, are obliged to attend to such tasks. Fees 
covering LABC activities connected to planning and inspection fees were set by 
central government until April 1999. Since then, LABC sections have been free to set 
their own fees provided that they are clearly exhibited “at the counter”. A majority of 
local authorities have agreed a scale of remunerations (drawn up by the Local 
Government Association) sought in connection with such work. This scale has some 
flexibility permitting a plusage/discount of 10%.  
 
Domestic extension plan vetting and site visits to ensure compliance with building 
regulations currently accounts for c.30% of “Townville’s” LABC section total case 
load. The remainder is in connection with commercial premises: new build, re-fitting, 
extension, etc. Currently the average fees for domestic extension control are £70 for 
vetting the plans for such work and a further £210 to cover inspections. Although 
difficult to generalise across the broad spectrum of activity, which encompasses 
domestic extension regulation, typically six site inspections are involved, timed to 
coincide with various stages of the work in progress, to ensure safety and compliance 
with Building Regulations (1991). This number can double, if the construction work 
is taking place on a site characterised by soft ground, land liable to subsidence, or is 
undertaken by a “difficult” contractor unwilling to abide by the building regulations 
and co-operate with LABC inspectors. It might be suggested that the fees generated 
by such activities are less than sufficient to permit the LABC section to break-even.  
 
In a historical context, the charges for domestic work can perhaps be better 
understood when informed by the perception that the fees for commercial work are 
higher than those imposed by the independent, approved private building inspectors. 
Commercial work provides 70% of the LABC’s case load and once more, although 
difficult to generalise, can be approximated to £4,000 per case. The average non-
domestic extension earns c£3,200. However, some commercial clients in particular 
offer revenue streams of great importance. A “one off” new development, e.g. an 
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office block, museum, etc, may net in excess of £100,000. In “Townville’s” case, the 
“jewel in the crown”, is the local National Health Service Trust (NHST), 
which had gained in importance as the NHST has centralised activity upon one site 
now offering almost the entire gamut of health related care. This site is crowded with 
Hospital buildings that are constantly being altered to adjust its facilities in line with 
the (limited) resources available and the shifting/increasing demands placed upon it. 
Hospitals are governed by separate building practices (e.g. the structures must permit 
evacuation of the incapacitated) and the LABC section attempt to respond swiftly in 
the twin tasks of vetting building plans and site inspections for this “big player”. 
As with many services provided by local government prioritisation is problematic. 
Within the LABC section, this remains true but governed by the public service ethos 
of attempting to respond to all the calls that they receive.  
 
The tensions regarding prioritisation that this position generates can be predicted to be 
exacerbated by the addition of another major “partnership” player. Currently the 
singular is applicable, for LABC sections can partner one other private organisation, 
perhaps a major developer, architectural practice or engineering/design consultancy. 
Seeking partnerships, i.e. a plurality, can only be achieved under current regulations if 
one LABC section seeks and attains the approval of other LABC authorities in the 
region for this arrangement. Several LABC sections have already successfully courted 
partnership with some private sector organisations regarded as institutions in the UK. 
Examples from the realms of retail include Boots the Chemist partnering 
Nottingham’s LABC and Marks & Spencers partnership with Birmingham’s LABC. 
The gains for these LABC sections are considerable as they attract a percentage of the 
fees for plan vetting for developments outside their border. They attract all plan 
vetting revenue and the site inspection fees for store re-developments or new build 
within their border.  
 
As with NHSTs, such stakeholders have legitimacy, the continuation or expansion of 
a legal business, permitting the generation of tax revenues for both local and central 
government the provision of employment. They have the attribute of urgency, for 
without speedy completion by the LABC section, these “good causes” cannot be 
served and this has self-evident implications for task prioritisation. They will also 
have the power resource, in Etzioni’s sense of utilitarian power: for without speed, the 
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benefits of tax revenues, commercial development and employment will be impeded. 
Should these corporate entities not receive the (perceived) level of service from the 
partnership with a LABC section, they also have the freedom to seek out the services 
of the private approved inspectors and withdraw the revenue stream from the local 
authority’s coffers. In a very real sense they may soon (if not already) come to be 
regarded through Mitchell et al’s conceptualisation at least as the definitive 
stakeholders. 
 
Wither then the citizen? It could be argued that they might gain as a result of this 
partnership, even if the private sector partner assumes definitive status. Perhaps 
directly as a result of securing employment either during construction, building 
refurbishment, or after completion? Perhaps as a result of increased cash flow within 
their local authority or from a national revenue stream re-distributed by national 
government? Conversely, it might also be argued that those citizens that call directly 
on their LABC section, seeking planning approval for home extensions have become 
dependent stakeholders. They have both urgency and legitimacy, but as individuals 
very little power. Unless political influence is garnered (perhaps by lobbying their 
local councillor(s)), they lack the resources to also attain definitive stakeholder status. 
The cynic might suggest that this has always been the case and hence the citizen’s lot 
remains unchanged. Or, that the citizen’s lot (in terms of the speed with which his 
plans are vetted and the site visits can be arranged) will be adversely affected by the 
arrival of one definitive stakeholder or more.  
 
Partnership or Stakeholder Salience, Hegemony and Coercion? 
Problematically for the model provided by CIPFA, (shown as Figure One) which 
emphasises stakeholders as at the heart of the changes both current and future by Best 
Value, stakeholder salience is ignored. The model, at least in our view tends to imply 
an undifferentiated amorphous mass of stakeholders that are central to Best Value,  
each benefiting from the process. The relative attributes of each (power, legitimacy, 
urgency) are ignored as is the scale of relative benefits each draw from the partnership 
initiative. 
 
At the macro (nation state) level, in hegemonic terms, the “spontaneous consent” 
given by the great mass of the population to the ejection of the last Conservative 
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administration and the installation of Blair’s New Labour Party was evidenced by a 
landslide victory at the polls in May 1997.  Whether in Gramsci’s terms this was 
“historically caused” rather than just “historic” is open to debate. That (at the time of 
writing February 2000) they have become the “dominant group” is not. The present 
administration also retains the power of coercion. 
 
 At the meso level (that of the local authority), such “spontaneous consent” to the 
ablation of CCT and its replacement with Best Value which emphasises partnership 
was not universal, but overwhelming. At the level of the local authority, the 
government remains the dominant group. Within this, however, with LABC as the 
focus of analysis, there now are other emergent, private sector stakeholders which 
possess the necessary salient characteristics to distort not the significance of central 
government, which is acknowledged as remaining beyond challenge, but rather the 
position of the citizen. For the influence of the private sector partners within building 
control may be predicted (if Mitchell et al’s analysis proves accurate) to alter the 
balance of prioritisation (which is directly related to urgency) on a scale as yet unseen 
and unknown. For as explained above, private sector entities have the attributes 
required to become definitive stakeholders.  
 
Consequentially, at the micro-level – that of the citizen – perhaps either relegated to, 
or simply remaining a dependent stakeholder, the impact of Best Value and this 
particular partnership context may have been over stated. Perhaps they will be 
required to become more akin to the demanding stakeholder who are like “mosquitoes 
buzzing in the ears” of managers. 
 
Best Value, Partnership and The Schizophrenic Manager. 
The focus of this paper has been on three stakeholders in particular: central 
government, a small part of local government (LABC) and the citizen. The role of 
planning professionals within local authorities has not yet been alluded to in any 
depth. The proposed partnership arrangements present them with many problems not 
all of, which can be resolved speedily, if at all. It should be recalled that the external 
partnership with a private sector organisation is unlikely to come about unless the 
DTA can come to fruition. This will require inter-departmental co-operation on a 
scale rarely seen in local authorities. Planners, City Engineers, Street Lighting 
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departments among others will have to overcome at least two hurdles: first, the 
propensity towards “silo” management with a more integrated team approach (see 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Second the cultural shifts required towards a greater 
appreciation of  “customer relations marketing” to meet the mores of private sector 
enterprises. Both are replete with difficulties, this however is not the full extent of 
their problems, for concurrently with these potential changes, they will also have to 
retain a public-service ethos, to meet the expectations of the citizen. Should they fail 
in these endeavours, then the option under Best Value policy is open to remove 
LABC from the gamut of activities and services offered by a local authority.  
 
Conclusions. 
In the authors’ view, the word “partnership” conjures a picture of collaboration and 
co-operation rather than competition and exploitation. Perhaps, given the stakeholder 
salience typology offered by Mitchell et al, each particular partnership requires 
analysis, each set of potentially hegemonic and coercive relations to be understood 
fully prior to their embrace.  
 
In the case described, predictions are offered which are (necessarily) based on the 
selective perceptions of social constructs that permit attributions to be allocated. 
Perhaps these will prove accurate, perhaps otherwise. Without doubt, greater 
efficiency in plan vetting and site visitations from LABC representatives is to be 
welcomed by all. However, if “efficiency” is understood in the narrow context of 
inputs : outputs, then the larger and more lucrative contracts awarded by the 
commercial sector provides an inexorable logic which relegates the smaller 
“domestic” requirements of the citizen, despite the perceived urgency and legitimacy 
of their clamour for attention.  
 
Paradoxically, not every LABC  section can be foreseen to benefit from this 
partnership. If one LABC should successfully partner one or more “major players”, 
presumably the revenue stream attracted to that LABC section is diverted from others 
– the net revenue stream can be predicted to remain stable in the short term, but its 
distribution is less predictable. For those that succeed, the challenges of integrated 
team-management and cultural issues need to be overcome to establish the DTA prior 
to seeking a private partner. For those that do not succeed, commercial logic may 
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dictate that this work is increasingly spun-off to the approved private inspectors, 
perhaps only a small core of LABC staff remaining to deal with domestic work. In 
this instance, perhaps partnership is not as rosy a prospect as many might envisage. 
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Abstract. 
This work offers a case study of a potential partnership arrangement between an 
English local authority’s Building Control section, tasked with vetting plans for 
building works and site inspections to ensure compliance with Building Regulations 
(1991) and a private sector organisation. The authors argue that the introduction of 
such a partnership under the guise of the Best Value initiative has the inherent 
possibility of  permitting a hegemonic approach to the division between “routine 
domestic” work undertaken for individual citizens and that done for the private sector 
partner. This raises the question of Best Value for whom? 
 
The potential partnership initiative is analysed by deploying the stakeholder salience 
typology devised by Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) which assists by permitting 
inquiry into the stakeholder characteristics of urgency, power and legitimacy. The 
authors suggest that the development of such partnership arrangements may 
undermine both the position of the citizen and that of other Local Authority Building 
Control (LABC) sections.  
 
 
